Commentary: In wake of US election, conditions are ripe for a more active ASEAN bloc

KUALA LUMPUR: If you ask a Southeast Asian who they would have preferred to win the 2024 United States presidential election – Kamala Harris or Donald Trump – it’s likely many might answer “no preference”. 
This is not only because both Harris and Trump’s foreign and trade policy approach are directionally similar, save for the intensity (Harris’ “small yard, high fence” restrictions to protect critical technologies vs Trump’s 10-60 tariffs plan) and personality (“personal” Harris vs “transactional” Trump).
More importantly, as a region at the periphery of global superpowers, Southeast Asia has learnt how to manage great power conflict to its benefit through its culture of pragmatism and multi-alignment. 
Part of this stems from the region’s history. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand as its founding members, was formed in the middle of one of modern history’s most ideologically contested periods, the Cold War (1947 to 1989).
Initially the body’s purpose was subtly political, with a view for largely non-communist founding states to check on the expansion of Marxism-Leninism in the region. ASEAN was strongly supported by the US that pushed this ideology, and, oppositionally, condemned by China and the Soviet Union as a neo-imperialist American creation. Ideology, however, left a bitter memory for Southeast Asia.
Proxy wars were fought in the region, with Laos remaining as the most bombed country per capita in history, and society divided sharply in clashes between the communists, nationalists, and anti-communist groups. Authoritarian regimes rose, often backed by superpowers behind the ideological divide, and the economy was in ruins.
Towards the end of the Cold War, coinciding with a strong push by member states for economic development and a decline in ideology, ASEAN switched gears to a pragmatic approach.
ASEAN extended memberships to former adversaries including Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia; established dialogue partnerships with 11 countries including US, China, European Union, Russia and United Kingdom; and signed intra- and inter-regional free trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2020. Member states separately hosted high-profile summits, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, G20, East Asia Forum, and ASEAN summits, where global superpowers converge. 
Among others, ASEAN’s trade policy is the best signal of its pragmatic economic-first approach. Southeast Asia is the most heavily traded major region in the world, where trade accounts for 89 per cent of its gross domestic product, compared to the world average of 43 per cent.
The Straits of Malacca is one of the busiest trading routes in the world, with 90,000 container vessels passing through each year, carrying half of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage, bearing a quarter of world’s trade and one-third of crude oil.
Since the trade tensions rose between US and China, Southeast Asia has assumed its place as a “global connector” as many of its member states’ trade with US and China has substantially increased.
This pragmatic approach has served it well, propelling one of the greatest economic miracles in history. For the past 30 years, real GDP growth in the six largest ASEAN countries averaged 3.8 times, led by Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia, whereas real GDP per capita rose by 2.6 times.
In 2000, ASEAN’s combined GDP was US$620 billion, which was one-eighth of Japan’s. Two decades later, ASEAN’s GDP is US$3 trillion compared to Japan’s US$5 trillion, and the region is projected to exceed Japan by 2030 to become the fourth-largest economy in the world.
Though ASEAN had been able to trade across a heterogeneous political spectrum within – democracy, autocracy, communism, and absolute monarchy – it could not ignore the increasing demands to pick sides, prompting analysts to surmise that eventually ASEAN may need to.
A world where trade is restricted and alignment is demanded is the least ideal outcome for trade-heavy, economic-first ASEAN. To avoid that, ASEAN ought to consider stronger economic mechanisms to drive up trade and its collective bargaining strength.
Whilst it is true that the GDP distance of the US and China will likely enlarge compared to the next major power, it does not mean that smaller countries have no bargaining strength. Countries like Malaysia, Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia and Botswana are rising upper-middle-income countries with growing bargaining strength and influence.
The central idea here is to use economic strength, cemented in pragmatism and accommodation, as ASEAN’s bargaining reservoir to demand for continued neutrality and resistance against picking sides.
This approach, however, calls for a departure from a passive non-alignment stance to one that is careful, considered, and proactive neutrality. It is, therefore, opportune for ASEAN to consider deepening economic integration, both internally and externally with other blocs.
This could take a few forms, all of which are economic in nature and not seeking political integration similar to the EU model. The most significant of these is the ASEAN Power Grid, which aims to integrate the power systems of member states and which has widely-accepted benefits (decarbonisation, creating up to 9,000 jobs annually). Resolving the Laos-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore pilot implementation snag is priority, as this would build regional-level planning abilities. With this, discussions about grid infrastructure financing will also follow, serving as a test for region-wide financing structures.
Another related substantive economic integration is regional infrastructure enhancement, such as highways and railways, that are supported by regional funding mechanisms. To truly transform ASEAN from a disparate conglomerate of diverse entities to a 650-million market, labour mobility could feature as a top economic item. This could be focused on high-skilled talents rather than a wholesale free movement, which meets the stage of development of most member states.
On top of that, ASEAN could be used as a platform for inter-regional cooperation with other large economic blocs, such as the BRICS, US, China, EU, MERCOSUR, African Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. This could translate to more meaningful broad-base and/or sectoral free trade agreements or action plans with investment zones, and ASEAN would serve as a prime advocate for trade in the world.
Understandably, critics may argue that ASEAN has not been an effective organisation precisely due to its non-interference approach, where member states may ignore regional pressures and proceed with business-as-usual. However, there are a few conditions that favour historical moves to integrate.
One, alignment of leaders’ interests. Major member states’ leaders are prioritising economic growth over other policies, as countries are competing to catch up or move up the value chain. Technology and renewables have also featured prominently in member states’ leaders’ agenda. As most leaders in the largest member states were appointed less than five years ago, there is also an eagerness to prove themselves through a thriving economic and investment result.
Second, trade protectionism is a worsening threat. Regional economies tend to coalesce when external environments are disorderly, let alone a trade-heavy region that has seen the advantages of an open economy like ASEAN. Such openness to regional integration may not be received as readily under peacetime.
Third, Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s legitimacy of chairmanship in 2025. Not only is Anwar’s storied political history and international diplomacy a standout, but he represents a relatable interest point, as Malaysia was the first ASEAN leader to establish relations with China in 1974 (signalling openness to trade), and has a direct stake in the South China Sea dispute. As 2025 falls at the midterm of his prime ministership, Anwar also has the opportunity to adopt a legacy-building steer by prioritising substantive integration not previously succeeded.
ASEAN’s comeback story has validated its pragmatic approach that has wider lessons in today’s world. The next decade demands greater thought and proactivity, so that ASEAN can become like the many facets of a gemstone, each splitting in different ways – but coalescing in the same light.
James Chai is a political analyst, columnist and the author of Sang Kancil (Penguin Random House).